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Introduction
The distribution problem is classically solved by using Public Key Cryptosystems. They work as follows: Alice and Bob possess, in advance, a common secret key. This secret key can be used many times to distribute among them, several private keys that they are going to use to encrypt messages through e.g. the Vernam cypher method. Any time Alice (the sender) wants to distribute a private key to encrypt later messages, she only needs to make one key publicly available, referred as the public key. From this public key any receiver can extract the private key, but only Bob (the receiver in possesion of the secret key) can extract it in an efficient way. Any receiver without the secret key needs to decrypt a problem which has nonpolynomial (NP) complexity. This way of distributing a secure key can be done even when the key's length is much smaller than the message and even if the key is used several times.
Nowadays bank's security, electronic commerce and the internet are mostly based on one of these algorithms, the RSA Cryptography algorithm proposed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman from the MIT. Security in RSA algorithm relies on the fact that to decrypt the algorithm one needs to solve the factorisation problem which is an NP problem. Even now, there is no efficient algorithm known to solve the factorisation problem. This means that even though computational resources increase constantly, one simply needs to exploit the NP character of the algorithm to make the solution harder to find. Moreover, the key can eventually be redistributed and changed.
The "Quantum Computer" arises here first as a menace for Classical Key Distribution methods and then as a the solution for the security in Cryptography. Based on the Quantum nature of the microscopic world, this new generation of computers, still in a theoretical stage, are known to be able to solve hard mathematical problems rapidly. In 1994 Peter Shor proposed a Quantum protocol to solve the factorisation problem in an efficient way, known as the Shor's algorithm. If such a computer can be realised, current cryptographic protocols will not be anymore secure.
Can Quantum Mechanics then offer a solution for a secure Cryptography method? The answer is yes. Based on the intrinsic nature of the microscopic world, Quantum Mechanics permits to perform Cryptography in an unconditional secure way. At present, Quantum Cryptography is the only real implementation of QI. In this work, we will present one way of performing efficient Quantum Cryptography using entangled Gaussian states of light and standard optical devices (Gaussian operations).
Classical Cryptography
Vernam cypher
In Classical Cryptography there is a protocol called Vernam cypher which is absolutely secure. This protocol is the best and most well known classical private key (or ONE-TIME-PAD) cryptosystem. In order to achieve security in communications between two parties (Alice and Bob) with the Vernam cypher protocol, one needs to have a private key, in advance, possessed by Alice and Bob exclusively of at least the same length (# of bits) as the message to be encoded. This key has to be random and in possession of Alice and Bob only, and so a Classical Key Distribution is a pre-condition to achieve this absolute security. If this is the case, then Cryptography is going to be absolutely secure and works as follows.
If Alice wants to encode a message m with the key k, she only needs to perform the following operation between the message and the key, and send the encoded message e to Bob: Enc k (m) = m ⊕ k = e.
(1.1)
Only Bob who has also the key can decode the message (invert the operation) because the key Alice has used is random. Thus, he only needs to use the key again and perform the following operation to the encoded message e to retrieve the original message m:
Let us illustrate Vernam cypher with an specific example. Alice wants to communicate to Bob, in a secure way, a message m (in a binary string) of e.g. 9 bits. They share the key k of the same size as the message (9 bits). Alice encodes her message by applying a XOR (exclusive OR) 1 operation between the message m and the key k.
In the following table we summarise the XOR operation
As a result Alice has the encoded message e, that will send to Bob in a public way. message m = 010011101 key k = 110100011 encoded message e = 1000111110
Then Bob wants to readout the message, and thus, performs the inverse operation (which is again a XOR) between the encoded message e and the key k.
As a result Bob has the decoded message d that coincides with the message Alice wanted to communicate to him.
encoded message e = 1000111110 key k = 110100011 decoded message d = 010011101
Public key distribution: The RSA algorithm
Thus far, Classical Cryptography has not solved the distribution of the private key needed to perform Vernam cypher encryption. This distribution can be done in a public and practical secure way with the RSA algorithm. Nowadays the RSA algorithm is the most commonly used algorithm of public key. It is a Classical Key Distribution algorithm that permits together with the Vernam cypher method to perform secure communication as long as the factorisation problem is unsolved. Let us illustrate how it works with the following example.
i) The sender, say Alice, chooses two "big" different prime numbers, say p = 61 and q = 53 and computes its product n = p q = 3233 and also the following quantity φ = (p − 1)(q − 1) = 3120.
ii) She chooses a positive integer l smaller and coprime with φ, in the example l = 17.
iii) As a private key, Alice gives to Bob the number k such that k l = 1 mod (φ), take e.g. k = 2753. At the same time Alice makes public l and n, what we call public key.
iv) With the public key (l and n) anyone can encrypt a message m and send it to Bob, but only Bob who is in possesion of the private key k is able to decrypt the message. This method can thus be used to perform Classical Key Distribution. Any time Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she sends a secure key encrypted with l and n and only Bob will be able to retrieve it. Once Bob has the secure key, Alice can send messages to Bob via the Vernam cypher using this secure key. v) Encryption proceeds as follows. Alice wants to distribute a key encoded in a message m = 123. She uses the public key and computes the encryption Enc l,n (m) = m l mod (n) = e = 855. vi) Bob now wants to decrypt the message e to extract a secure key, so he calculates Dec k,n (e) = Dec k,n [Enc l,n (m)] = e k mod (n) = d = m = 123. Bob is the only one in possesion of the private key k and so the only one that can decrypt the message e to find the secure key Alice is going to use with the Vernam cypher to communicate securely with him.
The private key Alice and Bob share can be used more than once to distribute secure keys, in such a way that, to perform Vernam cypher we no longer need to share a long private key because we can distribute many of them in a secure way. Security relies in the fact that, from the encrypted message e, and the public keys l and n it is very difficult to find the private key k (and so m) or the original two prime numbers q and p, even in the case we are reusing the key k. This is because factorisation is a NP problem, whose efficient solution is not known yet. Security thus, in the RSA algorithm, relies on the fact that with the current computation resources, NP problems cannot be solved efficiently. 
The solution to the distribution of the key
What Quantum Cryptography offers is an absolutely secure distribution of a random key which combined with the Vernam cypher guarantees completely secure Cryptography. Thus, the Quantum Cryptography problem is in fact the problem of distributing a secure random key, i.e. the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) problem.
Quantum Cryptography relies on the possibility of establishing a secret random key between two distant parties traditionally denoted by Alice and Bob. If the key is securely distributed, the algorithms used to encode and decode any message can be made public without compromising security. The key consists typically in a random sequence of bits which both, Alice and Bob, share as a string of classically correlated data. The superiority of Quantum Cryptography comes from the fact that the laws of Quantum Mechanics permit to the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to infer if an eavesdropper has monitored the distribution of the key and has gained information about it. If this is the case, Alice and Bob will both agree in withdrawing the key and will start the distribution of a new one. In contrast, Classical Key Distribution, no matter how difficult the distribution from a technological point of view is, can always be intercepted by an eavesdropper without Alice and Bob realising it.
In Quantum Cryptography two seemingly independent main schemes exist for QKD. The first, the "Prepare and Measure" scheme, originally proposed by C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1988 and known as BB84 [1] , does not use entangled states shared between Alice and Bob and the key is established by sending nonentangled quantum states between the parties and communicating classically. Security is guaranteed by the Quantum nature of the measurements. The second scheme ("Entanglement based"), uses as a resource shared entanglement, like the one originally proposed by A. Ekert in 1991 known as Ekert91 [2] , where indeed entanglement is explicitly distributed and the security is guaranteed by Bell's theorem. However, the two schemes have been shown to be completely equivalent [3] , and specifically entanglement stands as a precondition for any secure key distribution [4] .
Introduction
Alice random bits 0
ii) Bob receives the states and measures in another random choice of bases. The outcome of the measurements is going to be retained as the bits received.
iii) Bob communicates to Alice his choice of basis in a public way. iv) Alice identifies the set of bits for which they have performed the measurement in the same basis, i.e. outcomes 3, 4, 6, 8 and 9. Alice and Bob discard the set of data in which they did not agree (the rest).
v) Bob sends part of his data (received bits) to Alice by a public channel. Alice checks the correlation between the data. vi) If the error rate is less than 25% Alice deduces that there is not an eavesdropper present and she communicates it to Bob. Alice and Bob use the set of remaining data as a private key to encrypt messages with Vernam cypher.
"Entanglement based" scheme
Other protocols exist, which demand as a fundamental resource, shared entanglement between Alice and Bob. In the same way as in BB84, these protocols permit a secure distribution of a secret key. This can be done as far as the protocol ensures if there has been an interception of the key. Security relies in the Quantum correlations i.e. entanglement like in Ekert91. We sketch here the steps of this well-known protocol below.
i) The first step consists on distributing (along the z direction) singlet states of a spin-1/2 system (or polarisations of photons) between Alice and Bob. Thus Alice and Bob share many copies of a Bell state
(|0 |1 − |1 |0 ). ii) Alice and Bob are going to measure in the x − y plane in one of the three directions given by unit vectors A i = (cos φ A i , sin φ A i ) and B j = (cos φ B j , sin φ B j ) respectively, where the azimuthal angles are fixed to φ A i = (0, π/4, π/2) i and to φ B j = (π/4, π/2, 3π/4) j . Each time they will choose the basis randomly and independently for each pair of incoming particles.
iii) The quantity
is the correlation coefficient of the measurements performed by Alice and Bob along A i and by Bob along B j . Here P ±± ( A i , B j ) denotes the probability that result ±1 has been obtained along A i and ±1 along B j . Straightforward calculations give rise to
. We see that whenever they choose the same orientation Quantum Mechanics predicts total anticorrelation in the outcomes i.e. E( A i , B j ) = −1.
iv) Here we define a quantity composed of those correlation coefficients for which Alice and Bob have measured in different directions,
Again, Quantum Mechanics requires, S = 2 √ 2 > 2. v) After the transmission has taken place, Alice and Bob can announce in public the orientations they have chosen for each measurements and divide them into two separated groups. A first group for which they coincide and a second group for which they do not. The second group of outcomes is made public and it is used to establish the value of S.
The CHSH (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Hold) inequalities, a generalisation of Bell inequalities, asserts that S ≤ 2. But Quantum Mechanics, and in particular Bell states, violate CHSH inequalities. If this is the case, i.e. the value of S that they find is exactly 2 √ 2, they now that their states have not been disturbed and so the first group of outcomes, that are random, are totally anticorrelated and can be converted into a secret string of bits. Later on they can use this string as a private key to encrypt messages with Vernam cypher.
Efficiency in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols
As already mentioned, Quantum Key Distribution, refers to specific Quantum strategies which permit the secure distribution of a secret key between two parties that wish to communicate secretly. Quantum Cryptography has been proved unconditionally secure in ideal scenarios and has been successfully implemented using quantum states with finite (discrete) as well as infinite (continuous) degrees of freedom. We have analysed the efficiency of QKD protocols that use as a resource entangled Gaussian states and Gaussian operations only. In this framework, it has already been shown that QKD is possible [5] but the issue of its efficiency was not considered. We have propose a figure of merit (the efficiency E) to quantify the number of classical correlated bits that can be used to distill a key from a sample of N entangled states. We have related the efficiency of the protocol to the entanglement and purity of the states shared between the parties.
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Notice that if Alice and Bob share a collection of distillable entangled states, they can always obtain a smaller number of maximally entangled states from which they can establish a secure key [6] . The number of singlets (maximally entangled states) that can be extracted from a quantum state using only Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC) is referred to as the Entanglement of Distillation E D . In order to establish a key, another important concept is the number of secret bits K D , that can be extracted from a quantum state using LOCC. As a secret bit can always be extracted from maximally entangled state, E D ≤ K D . Furthermore, there are quantum states which cannot be distilled but in spite of being entangled, i.e., have E D = 0. They are usually referred to as bound entangled states since its entanglement is bound to the state. Nevertheless, for some of those states it has been shown that K D = 0 and thus they can be used to establish a secret key [7] .
A particular case of states that cannot be "distilled" by "normal" procedures are continuous variables Gaussian states, e.g., coherent, squeezed and thermal states of light. By "normal" procedures we mean operations that preserve the Gaussian character of the state (Gaussian operations). They correspond e.g. to beam splitters, phase shifts, mirrors, squeezers, etc. Thus, in the Gaussian scenario all entangled Gaussian states posses bound entanglement. Quantum Cryptography with Gaussian states using Gaussian operations has been experimentally implemented using "Prepare and Measure" schemes with either squeezed or coherent states [8, 9, 10] . Those schemes do not demand entanglement between the parties. Navascués et al. [5] have shown that it is also possible using only Gaussian operations to extract a secret keyà la Ekert91 from entangled Gaussian states, in spite the fact that these states are not distillable. In other words, it has been proven that in the Gaussian scenario all entangled Gaussian states fulfil GK D > 0 (where the letter G stands for Gaussian) while GE D = 0.
The way to proceed in this scheme i.e., how can, Alice and Bob extract a list of classically correlated bits from a set a of symmetric 1 × 1 entangled modes goes as follows: i) they agree on a value x 0 > 0, ii) Alice(Bob) measures the quadrature of each of her(his) modesX A (X B ), iii) they make public the modulus of their outcomes, but not the sign and accept only outputs such that |x A | = |x B | = x 0 , iv) they associate e.g., the classical value 0(1) to x i = +x 0 (−x 0 ), i = A, B and thus establish a list of classically correlated bits.
From there, they can apply Classical Advantage Distillation [11] to establish the secret key. This protocol is secure against individual eavesdropper attacks. As the protocol is based on output coincidences of the measurements of the quadratures which, by definition, are operators with a continuous spectrum, this protocol has zero efficiency.
Outline
Efficiency is a key issue for any experimental implementation of Quantum Cryptography since available resources are not unlimited. Since it is possible to extract a secret keyà la Eckert91 from entangled Gaussian states in the Gaussian scenario one important question is to address the efficiency.
In fact, the protocol suffers from an efficiency problem because the success probability of the protocol is vanishingly small. Here we study the consequences of relaxing the conditions to a more realistic scenario. We assume that Alice and Bob can extract a list of sufficiently correlated classical bits obtained by accepting measurement outputs that do not coincide but are bound within a range. We ask ourselves which is the possibility that Alice and Bob can still distribute the key in a secure way under individual and finite coherent attacks.
We find that there always exists a finite interval which the protocol can be implemented successfully. The length of this interval depends on the entanglement and on the purity of the shared states, and increases with increasing entanglement.
In Chapter 2 we review the formalism of Continuous Variable (CV) systems focussing on Gaussian states. It will be shown that Gaussian states admit an easy mathematical description based on phase space Wigner functions. We will introduce also the basic ingredients to describe also systems with entanglement.
In Chapter 3 we will present first a simple academic protocol that permits to extract a quantum key from an entangled continuous variable system. Differently from discrete systems, Gaussian entangled states cannot be distilled with Gaussian operations. However, as we will show, it is possible to extract perfectly correlated classical bits to establish a secret key between the sender and receiver. We will then demonstrate that this protocol, properly modified, can be made efficient and can be implemented with present technology [12] .
Finally, in Chapter 4, we conclude summarising our results and giving some general conclusions and future directions of research.
Chapter 2 Continuous Variable formalism
This Chapter is intended exclusively to describe Continuous Variable systems and to provide the mathematical framework to analyse the problem of QKD in Continuous Variable systems. We will focus then on Gaussian Continuous Variable states, which describe among others, coherent, squeezed and thermal states of light. Presently these states are the preferred resources in experiments of QI using Continuous Variable systems. For further background information the interested reader is referred to [13, 14, 15, 16] .
Continuous Variable system
A system corresponds to a continuous variable system if it possesses two canonical conjugated degrees of freedom i.e. there exist two observables that fulfil the Canonical Commutation Relations (CCR). The CCR for two canonical observablesq and
It is a direct consequence that they possess a continuous spectra and act in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space.
As examples of CV systems we can think as the position-momentum of a massive particle, the quadratures of an electromagnetic field or the collective spin of a polarised ensemble of atoms. In all of the three examples above there exist two observables fulfilling (2.1). As we will show, they obey the standard bosonic commutation relations and so we call these systems bosonic modes. We can deal with several modes, and in this case ordering the operators by canonical pairs bŷ R T = (q 1 ,p 1 ,q 2 ,p 2 , ...,q N ,p N ) we can compactly state CCR as
where i, j = 1, 2, ..., 2N and J N = ⊕ N i=1 J accounts for all modes while J is the socalled symplectic matrix which corresponds to a antisymmetric and non-degenerate form fullfilling (i) ∀η, ζ ∈ R 2N : η|J|ζ = − ζ|J|η and (ii) ∀η : η|J|ζ = 0 ⇒ ζ = 0. In the appropriate choice of basis (canonical coordinates) the symplectic matrix is brought into the standard form J = 0 1 −1 0
Canonical Commutation Relations
The CCR (2.1) are related with the classical Poisson brackets via the 1 st quantisation transcription:
≡ −i(ÂB −BÂ) and A −→Â. They can be also described by using the annihilation and creation operatorsâ µ andâ † µ which obey the standard bosonic commutation relations
The CCR in forms (2.2) and (2.3) are related by a unitary matrix
The representation of the CCR up to unitaries is not unique. For instance, for a single mode in the Schrödinger representation each degree of freedom is embedded in H = L 2 (R), while the operatorsq andp act multiplicative and derivative respectivelŷ A way to remove ambiguities (up to unitaries) and to treat with bounded operators is using the Weyl operators. The Weyl operator is defined aŝ
where ζ T = (ζ 1 , ζ 2 , ..., ζ 2N ). Then the Weyl operators satisfies the Weyl relation 6) or in an analogous wayŴ
Theorem 2.2.1 (Stone-von Neumann theorem) LetŴ 1 andŴ 2 be two Weyl systems over a finite dimensional phase space (N < ∞). If the two Weyl systems are strongly continuous 2 and irreducible 3 then they are equivalent (up to an unitary).
According to the theorem 2.2.1 there exists only one equivalent representation of the Weyl relation. The Weyl operator acts in the states as a translation in the phase space (displacements e iηp |q = |q − η and kicks e iζq |q = e iζq |q ) as it can be checked by looking to its action onto an arbitrary position-momentum operator
Phase-space
Phase space formulation of Quantum Mechanics offers a framework in which Quantum phenomena can be described using as much classical language as allowed. It appeals naturally to one's intuition and can often provide useful physical insights. Furthermore, it requires dealing only with constant number equations and not with operators, which can be of significant practical advantage. This mathematical advantage arises here from the fact that the infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space structure which is in principle a difficult object to work with, can be mapped into the linear algebra structure of the finite-dimensional real phase space. We will extend this map (2.3.1) and how to characterise states and operations in sections (2.4) and (2.3.2) respectively.
Phase space geometry
A system of N canonical degrees of freedom is described classically in a 2N -dimensional real vector space 4 V ≃ R 2N . Together with the symplectic form it defines a symplectic real vector space (the phase space) Ω ≃ R 2N . The phase space is naturally equipped with a complex structure and can be identified with a complex Hilbert space H Ω ≃ C N . If | stands for the scalar product in H Ω and | J for the symplectic scalar product in V their connection reads
where η = (q, p) ∈ V while η = q + ip ∈ H Ω such that any orthonormal basis in H Ω leads to a canonical basis in V . Moreover, any unitary operator (which preserve the scalar product) acting on H Ω leads to a symplectic operation S in the phase space in such a way that the symplectic scalar product is also preserved. The inverse is also true provided that the symplectic operation commutes with the symplectic matrix J.
Symplectic operations
We hence define symplectic canonical transformation S as these ones which preserve the CCR and therefore leave the basic kinematic rules unchanged. That is, if we transform our quadrature operatorsR S = S ·R still equation (2.2) is fulfilled. In a totally equivalent way we can define symplectic transformation as the ones which preserve the symplectic scalar product and therefore 5
The set of real 2N ×2N matrices S satisfying the above condition form the symplectic group Sp(2N, R). To construct the affine symplectic group we just need to add also the phase space translations whose group generators areĜ
Apart from that, the group generators of the representation of Sp(2N, R) which physically corresponds to the Hamiltonians which perform the symplectic transformations on the states are of the form 1 2 {R i ,R j }. This corresponds to hermitian Hamiltonians of quadratic order in the canonical operators. When rewriting them in terms of creation / annihilation operators we can divide it into two groups.
Compact generators (passive):
and non-Compact generators (active):
The passive ones are generators which commute with all the number operatorŝ n µ ≡â † µâµ and so they preserve the total number, in this sense they are passive. In case our system corresponds to modes of the electromagnetic field, then, what is being preserved is the total number of photons. They can be implemented optically by only using beam splitters, phase shifts and mirrors and conversely, only using them we can implement any Hamiltonian constructed by a linear combination of the compact generators. With all the generators we then have enough to generate all the unitaries,Û λ = e iλ·Ĝ .
As the simplest example for, one mode (N = 1) we have the phase shift operator
which amounts to the symplectic operation in phase space
On the other hand we have the active ones, they change the energy of the state. The most important one is the single mode squeezing operator (N = 1), whose unitary expression for a fixed angle φ = 0 and squeezing parameter r > 0 readŝ
(â 2 −â †2 ) (2.13)
5 From now on we neglect the subscript N in symplectic matrix.
while its symplectic operation in phase space reads S r = e −r 0 0 e r . (2.14)
Finally phase space translations for one mode whose unitary isÛ α = e αâ † −α * â where
, amounts to the symplectic operation in phase space as s α = q 0 p 0 .
The most important non-trivial unitaries for two modes (N = 2) are beam splitterŝ
2 ) (at fixed angle φ = 0, reflectivity R = sin 2 θ/2 and transmitivity T = cos 2 θ/2) and two mode squeezingsÛ T M S = e r(â 1â2 −â † 1â †
2 ) that amounts to
and
(2.16)
Probability Distribution functions
One of the most important tools of the phase space formulation of Quantum Mechanics are the phase space probability distribution functions. The best known and widely used is the Wigner distribution function, but there is not a unique way of defining a quantum phase space distribution function. In fact, several distribution functions with different properties, rules of association and operator ordering can also be well defined. For instance sometimes normal ordered (P-function), antinormal ordered (Q-function), generalised antinormal ordered (Husimi-function),... distributions can be more convenient depending on the problem being considered. In this dissertation we are only going to work with the totally symmetrical ordered (Weyl ordered) one, the Wigner distribution function. Due to the fact that a joint probability at a fixed positionq and momentump point is not allowed in Quantum Mechanics by Heisenberg uncertainty theorem, the quantum phase space distribution function should, therefore, be considered simply as a mathematical tool that facilitates quantum calculations. Joint probabilities can be negative, so that one deals with quasiprobability distributions as long as it yields a correct description of physically observable quantities. 
Quantum states
This transformation is called Weyl-Fourier transformation and it gives the bridge between density operators and distribution functions. Sometimes, for computational reasons it is better to compute first the characteristic distribution function which is obtained through
The above two distribution functions are fully equivalent in the sense of describing completely our quantum state and are related by a Symplectic-Fourier transform
The Weyl-Fourier transformation is invertible and it provides a way to recover our density operator from both distribution functionŝ ρ = 1 2π dq dp dζ dη W ρ (q, p)e
At this level, W (and χ) defines a quatum state iff they satisfy the following properties dq dp W(q, p) = 1, dq dp
(2.23) 6 For pure states the definition gets simplified to Wρ(q, p) =
for all pure states W p and
for all a i,j ∈ R. This can be shown using the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Quantum Bochner-Khinchin theorem) For χ(η) to be a characteristic function of a quantum state the following conditions are necessary and sufficient 1.) χ(0) = 1 and χ(η) is continuous at η = 0, 2.) χ(η) is J − positive (symplectic-positive defined). 
Properties of the Wigner distribution
Remember that when we are speaking about states of light m has to be interpret as permittivity of vacuum ǫ0 while there is a minus sign difference with Heisenberg's equation of motion.
8 Use Schwarz's inequality | ψ1|ψ2 | 2 ≤ ψ1|ψ1 ψ2|ψ2 at the density operator level i.e. 0 ≤ tr(ρ1ρ2) n ≤ tr(ρ1) n tr(ρ2) n . (no es ven be la dem) vii) Normalised: It is well normalised dq dp W(q, p) = 1. (2.31) viii) Quantum marginal distributions: It possesses good marginal distributions 9 dp W(q, p) = q|ρ|q ≥ 0 (2.32)
The set of functions W nm (q, p) form a complete orthonormal set (if ψ n (q) are already a set) dq dp W *
where
The generating function of a Classical probability distribution
Denoting by y (x) a random variable which can be discrete y ∈ {y i } (or continuous x ∈ [a, b]) and its corresponding (density) probability p(y i ) (p(x)), we can establish the normalisation constrain as
Of relevant importance given a probability distribution are the following quantities:
where i, j = 1, 2, ..., 2N .
9 For pure state they correspond to the square modulus of the wave function in position |ψ(q)| 2 and in momentum |ψ(p)| 2 representation. 10 Square root of the variance. 11 Here subindex i, j labels all the possible variables of the distribution, when they are equal, Cii corresponds to the variance of the variable xi. This theorem, of considerable importance, tell us that any distribution p(x) can be retrieved only by its moments α m c . We define the vector d and the matrix C called mean vector and covariance matrix by
What is more important is that d and C encode all the information of 1 st and 2 nd moments.
If we define the generating function of the distribution function by a Laplace transformation (provided it exists)
all moments can be obtained by subsequently differentiating the generating function
The generating function of a quasi-probability distribution
In the same way as in Classical Probability where all the moments of a distribution characterise the distribution, the Wigner quasidistribution function is fully characterised by its moments. To adapt the classical formalism to the quantum Wigner quasidistribution function we have to introduce the following transcription η −→ iη, M −→ χ, LT −→ FT .
We then define the generating function of the Wigner distribution (characteristic function) by a Fourier transformation, which always exists, because the Wigner distribution is an integrable function. In general it is complex and reads
then all moments can be obtained by subsequently differentiating the generating function
Analogously, we define, given a quantum Wigner distribution function the displacement vector (DV) d (a 2N real vector) and the covariance matrix (CM) γ (a 2N × 2N real symmetric matrix). The DV contains the information of the first moments and in general plays no role, by the space symmetry only relative DVs are of physical meaning. The CM is much more richer, it contains information (up to second moments) about the purity, entanglement, ... The CM to describe a physical state must be symplectic-positive defined γ + iJ ≥ 0.
(2.43)
Gaussian states
Among all the CV systems Gaussian states are of greatest importance. The Gaussian distribution is simple, it is the limit of many others and appears in a great variety of different conditions. In order to give a motivation we state here one of the most important theorems (together with the Law of Large Numbers) of the Theory of the Classical Probability and Statistics, the Central Limit Theorem.
Theorem 2.5.1 (Central limit theorem) Suppose we have n independent random variables x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n which are all distributed with a mean value µ and a standard deviation σ (each of them can have different arbitrary distribution functions p i (x i )).
In the limit n → ∞ the arithmetic meanx = 1 n n i=1 x i is Gaussian (or normal) distributed with mean value µ and standard deviation
Another way to see the importance of Gaussian probability distributions is encoded in the following theorem Theorem 2.5.2 (Marcinkiewicz's theorem) If we define the cumulant generating function as K(η) = ln M (η), then, either the cumulant is a polynomial of order 2 or it has infinite terms.
Lemma 2.5.1 (Gaussianity lemma) As a consequence then p(x) is a Gaussian(nonGaussian) distribution iff the cumulant is a polynomial of order 2(∞).
In general all moments are necessary but as long as we are concern with only Gaussian distributions, 1 st and 2 nd moments are sufficient, in fact all other higher moments can be rewritten in terms of them. This is a consequence of the theorem 2.5.2.
Displacement Vector (DV) and Covariance Matrix (CM)
An important class of quantum states are Gaussian states. They can be defined as all quantum states whose Wigner distribution function is Gaussian. Thus the DV and the CM are enough to describe them. Analogously to the classical case, it is straightforward to obtain the moments of order β m 0 of a distribution by differentiating the generating function. Computing 
Finally we define the DV and the CM as 13
It is important to remark here that symplectic operations at the level of the DV and CM act in such a way that any unitaryÛ S maps to the following transformation γ S = S · γ · S T and d S = d + s where S stands for an element of the symplectic group, while s stands for a phase space translation.
With these definitions it can be shown that the Wigner distribution of any Gaussian state can be written in terms of the DV and CM through 14
while its symplectic-Fourier transform reads
Theorem 2.5.3 (Minimum uncertainty states theorem) Equality in Heisenberg's uncertainty theorem is attained iff the state is a pure Gaussian state i.e. a rotated squeezed coherent state, |ψ =Û θÛrÛα |0 .
All pure Gaussian states of one mode, characterised by its γ (and if necessary by d), can be obtained from the vacuum state by an arbitrary displacement+squeezing+rotation in the phase space. These states, by theorem 2.5.3, are minimum uncertainty states. 13 For pure states di = R i ρ and γij = {Ri − diÎ,Rj − djÎ} ρ = {Ri,Rj } ρ − 2 R i ρ R j ρ, where, by the anticommutator definition, we see a factor 2 of difference with the classical analog and so γij ∼ 2Cij . The diagonal terms can be rewritten in terms of the uncertainties as γii = 2(∆Ri) Instead, mixed Gaussian states of one mode can be all obtained from a thermal state by an arbitrary displacement+squeezing+rotation.
As the cornerstone examples of Gaussian states, we have the vacuum, coherent, squeezed and thermal states.
*Vacuum: |0
where M = 1 e β −1 ≥ 0 being β the inverse temperature.
Hilbert space, phase space and DV&CM connection
We have already shown how to describe quantum states and operations at the different levels i.e. Hilbert space, phase space and DV&CM. Two main connections are needed still to perform calculations in the phase space: the ordering of the operators and the metric between them.
The Weyl association rule tells us about the ordering operators. Provided we are using with the Wigner distribution, which is symmetrical ordered, when working with observables we have to take into account that as we are in the phase space and we have avoided its operator character we have to symmetrise them. (2.55) As an example take the observable QP , its quantum associated operator is of courseqp. We know thatq andp do not commute but in the phase space qp and pq are functionally treated in the same way. Imagine we need to find its average value, we have then to remove the ambiguity by totally symmetrising. The recipe iŝ qp −→:qp :=qp +pq 2 ←→ qp. And so the average to be performed is
More important and relevant averages concern the moments which can be obtained via the Wigner distribution as 
This theorem is of capital importance, it follows from it how to compute the scalar product between operators 
(2.63)
To justify the above expression we just need to define properly the Fourier-Weyl transform asÂ
and its inverse
(2.66)
An important concept in Quantum Information is the fidelity F between quantum states. The one we adopt here is the so called Bures-Uhlmann fidelity and it is defined as follows
It is symmetric and normalised between 1 (equal states) and 0 (orthogonal states). Its definition is simplified when one of the two states is pure (sayρ 1 ), in this case it converges to the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity
In case both states are pure, then, the fidelity becomes simply the overlap between the two states
(2.71) 17 Notice that A W = (2π) N W ifÂ =ρ see eq. (2.18) (for normalisation convenience). 18 Notice that A χ = χ ifÂ =ρ see eq. (2.19).
It is useful here to use theorem 2.5.4 to evaluate the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity between two Gaussian state (at least when one is pure) 19
Another important concept in Quantum Information is the purity P of a quantum state. The purity is defined as follows
It is normalised between 1 (pure states) and 0 (maximally mixed states). Also here using theorem 2.5.4 we can evaluate the purity of a Gaussian state 20
Multipartite states and entanglement
If we want to treat the entanglement of a quantum state, first we need to introduce multipartite states. In general we have to extend the Hilbert space. At the level of density operators this means that we have to "tensor product" ⊗, the Hilbert space of each party i.e. H = N k=1 H k . The covariance matrix structure for Gaussian states turns to be simplified to a "direct sum" ⊕, of each party's associated phase space i.e. Ω = N k=1 Ω k . This is reminiscent of the Quantum Parseval theorem, which transforms tensor product between density matrices to products of Wigner functions (and Characteristic functions) and at the same time direct sums of covariance matrices. Therefore, the advantage of using Gaussian states is that we fully describe a state by a finite dimensional 2×2 matrix instead of its infinite dimensional density matrix. Additionally, dimensionality of the phase space increases slower, as dimensions are added instead of multiplied. 21
Bipartite Gaussian states
Any bipartite Gaussian state can be written in a block structure as γ = A C C T B , where A = A T and B = B T . 19 The second and third equality is true for all CV states. 20 The first equality is true for all CV states. 21 Remember that dim(ρ1 ⊗ρ2) = dim(ρ1) dim(ρ2) while dim(γ1 ⊕ γ2) = dim(γ1) + dim(γ2).
Lemma 2.6.1 (Normal form) Every 1 × 1 mode Gaussian state can be transformed (by two local symplectic transformations) to
If we define the four invariants of an arbitrary state A = det A, B = det B, C = det C and Υ = det γ, then the following holds
Lemma 2.6.2 (Standard form) Every 1×1 mode Gaussian state can be transformed (by local quasi-free symplectic transformations) to
where λ a , λ b ≥ 1 and k x ≥ |k p |. A Gaussian state in the Standard form is called symmetric if λ a = λ b , and fully symmetric if it is symmetric and in addition k x = k p .
Entanglement of Gaussian states
For discrete variable systems an important separability criteria based on the partial transpose (time reversal) exists. Lemma 2.6.3 (NPPT Peres criteria) Given a bipartite stateρ, if it has non-positive partial transpose (ρ T A 0 ⇒ρ T B 0), thenρ is entangled. Lemma 2.6.4 (NPPT Horodecki criteria) In C 2 ⊗ C 2 and C 2 ⊗ C 3 given a bipartite stateρ, it is entangled iff it has non-positive partial transpose (ρ T A 0 ⇒ρ T B 0).
For continuous variable states, Peres criteria also holds while Horodecki criteria is true provided our state is composed of 1 × N modes. In particular for Gaussian states, time reversal is very easy to implement at the covariance matrix level. IfT is the reversal operator then S T = θ = 1 0 0 −1 is the symplectic operations in phase space. So we can rewrite the lemma 2.6.4 for Gaussian states as Lemma 2.6.5 (NPPT Horodecki's criteria) For 1×N modes given a bipartite Gaussian state γ, it is entangled iff it has non-positive partial transpose (θ A γθ T A + iJ 0 ⇒ θ B γθ T B + iJ 0).
Concerning entanglement measures we use as an entanglement measure for pure state the Entropy of entanglement and for mixed ones the Logarithmic negativity.
*(Pure states) Entropy of entanglement:
where S is the von Neumann Entropy 22 S(ρ) = −tr(ρ logρ), andρ A is the trace over B defined asρ A = tr B (ρ). For any state it reduces (in terms of the Schmidt coefficients) to
while for Gaussian states,
where {µ i } = spec(−iJγ A ).
*(Mixed states) Logarithmic negativity (additive monotone):
where || || 1 is the trace norm defined as ||ρ|| 1 = tr|ρ| = tr ρ Tρ = singularvalues(ρ). For Gaussian states,
where {μ i } = spec(−iJγ T A ).
Appendix of integrals
Gaussian integrals:
Non-Gaussian integrals:
Useful integrals:
Efficiency in QKD protocols with entangled Gaussian states
Efficiency is a key issue in any real implementation of a cryptographic protocol since the physical resources are not unlimited. We will first show that Quantum Key Distribution is possible with an "Entanglement based" scheme with NPPT symmetric Gaussian states in spite of the fact that these systems cannot be distilled with Gaussian operations (they are all bound entangled). In this work we analyze the secrecy properties of Gaussian states under Gaussian operations. Although such operations are useless for quantum distillation, we prove that it is possible to distill efficiently a secret key secure against finite coherent attacks from sufficiently entangled Gaussian states with non-positive partial transposition. Moreover, all such states allow for efficient key distillation, when the eavesdropper is assumed to perform individual attacks before the reconciliation process. In section (3.1) we present the academic protocol [5] , while in section (3.2) we present the way to perform QKD with in the protocol in an efficient way.
State of the problem: QKD with entangled Gaussian states
Before presenting the protocol it is important to notice that Gaussian states always admit a purification. Thus, any mixed Gaussian state of N modes can be expressed as the reduction of a pure Gaussian state of 2N modes of the form:
such that the mixed state can be obtained after tracing out N modes from γ 2N .
Here θ = 1 0 0 −1 , which is the momentum reflection in phase-space, is the associated symplectic operation.
For what follows it is also important the fact that any NPPT Gaussian state can be mapped by Gaussian Local Operations and Classical Communication (GLOCC) to an NPPT symmetric state of 1 × 1 modes i.e. preserving the amount of entanglement.
As the last remark, to deal with the content of the entanglement in Gaussian states we are going to use the negativity. As it was stated in section (2.6.2), in terms of CMs and for 1×1 and 1×N modes of bipartite Gaussian states the PPT criterion, which tells us that a stateρ is entangled if and only if it has non positive partial transposition, reads θ A γθ T A + iJ < 0. With all the formalism at hand we now review the main steps of the protocol used in [5] . Without loosing generality, and by virtue of the above properties of Gaussian states, one should only consider the case in which Alice and Bob share many copies of a quantum system of 1 × 1 symmetric NPPT Gaussian stateρ AB . To extract a list of classically correlated bits to establish a secret key, each party measures the quadratures of her/his modeX A,B and accepts only those outputs x A,B for which both parties have a consistent result |x A | = |x B | = x 0 . With probability p(i, j), each party associates the classical bit i = 0(1) to her/his outcome +x 0 (−x 0 ). The probability that their symbols do not coincide is given by ǫ AB = ( i =j p(i, j))/( i,j p(i, j)).
Having fixed a string of M classical correlated values, they can apply Classical Advantage Distillation [11] . To this aim, Alice generates a random bit b and encodes her string of M classical bits into a vector b of length M such that b Ai + b i = b mod (2). Bob checks that for his symbols all results b Bi + b i = b ′ mod (2) are consistent, and in this case accepts the bit b. The new error probability is given by
which tends to zero for sufficiently large M . The most general scenario for eavesdropping is to assume that Eve has access to the states before their distribution. Hence, the states that Alice and Bob share correspond to the reduction of a pure 4-mode state. We consider two types of attacks: (i) individual (or incoherent) attack, where Eve performs individual measurements, possibly non-Gaussian, over her set of states and (ii) finite coherent (or collective) attack, where Eve waits until the distribution has been performed, and, decides, which collective measurement gives her more information on the final key. Now, security with respect to individual attacks from the eavesdropper Eve, can be established if In [5] it was shown that any 1 × 1 NPPT state fulfils the above inequality and thus any NPPT Gaussian state can be used to establish a secure key in front of individual eavesdropper attacks. If we assume that Eve performs more powerful attacks, namely finite coherent attacks, then security is only guaranteed if the much more restrictive condition
is fulfilled. This new inequality is violated by some NPPT states. Notice that this implies that the analysed protocol is not good for these states in this more general scenario. Nevertheless, using the recent techniques of [17] , one can find states for which the presented protocol allows to extract common bits secure against this attack.
Efficient QKD with entangled Gaussian states
Let us now present our results. Notice that since security relies on the fact that Alice and Bob have better correlations than the information the eavesdropper can learn about their state, perfect correlation is not a requirement to establish a secure key. We denote Alice's outputs by x 0A and we calculate which are the outputs Bob can accept so that the correlation established between Alice and Bob outputs can be used to extract a secret bit. We use the standard form of a bipartite 1 × 1 mode Gaussian state,
with λ A,B ≥ 1, and c x ≥ |c p | ≥ 0 (we can shift the displacement vector to 0). We shall deal with mixed symmetric states and so λ A = λ B = λ. The positivity condition reads (λ − c x )(λ + c p ) ≥ 1, while the entanglement NPPT condition is given by (λ − c x )(λ − c p ) < 1. As in [5] , we impose that the global state including Eve is pure (she has access to all degrees of freedom outside Alice an Bob) while the mixed symmetric state, shared by Alice and Bob is just its reduction,
,
Performing a measurement with uncertainty σ, the probability that Alice finds ±|x 0A | while Bob finds ±|x 0B |, is given by the overlap between the state of Alice and Bob,ρ AB , and a pure product stateρ A,i ⊗ρ B,j (with i, j = 0, 1) of Gaussians centred at ±|x 0A |(±|x 0B |) respectively with σ width (noticeρ A,0 ≡ | + |x 0A | +|x 0A ||). We use here the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity for calculation, which gives:
for the probability that their symbols do coincide and,
for the probability that they do not coincide, where
Their error probability for σ → 0 reads
Let us calculate the state of Eve |e ±± after Alice has projected onto | ± |x 0A | and Bob onto | ± |x 0B | :
If we assume that Eve performs more powerful attacks, namely finite coherent attacks, then security is only guaranteed if [5] :
This condition is more restrictive than (3.3). With a similar calculation as before we obtain that now security is not guaranteed for all mixed entangled symmetric NPPT states, but only for those that also satisfy:
For such states, and given a measurement result x 0A of Alice, Bob will only accept outputs within the range:
As before, β ≥ 1 is fulfilled by conditions (3.17) and (3.22). Let us now focus on the efficiency issue. We define the efficiency E(γ AB ) of the protocol for a given state γ AB , as the average probability of obtaining a classically correlated bit. Explicitly,
The marginal distribution in phase-space is easily computed by integrating the corresponding Wigner function in momentum space [16] :
but the final expression of Eq. (3.25) has to be calculated numerically. Note that if Alice and Bob share as a resource M identical states (NPPT state for individual attacks, and NPPT fulfilling condition (3.22) for finite coherent attacks), the number of classically correlated bits that can be extracted from them is ∼ M ×E(γ AB ). The efficiency Eq. (3.25) increases with increasing D and decreasing ǫ AB . In particular, for the protocol given in [5] , D = 0, and therefore E(γ AB ) = 0 for any state.
We investigate now the dependence of E(γ AB ) with the entanglement of the NPPT mixed symmetric state used for the protocol as well as with the purity of the state. As a measure of the entanglement between Alice and Bob we compute the logarithmic negativity
In Fig. 3 .1, we display the efficiency of the protocol (assuming individual attacks) versus entanglement shared between Alice and Bob for different states γ AB . There is not a one-to-one correspondence between E(γ AB ) and entanglement, since states with the same entanglement can have different purity, which can lead to different efficiency. This is so because there are two favourable scenarios to fulfil Eq. (3.3). The first one is to demand large correlations so that the relative error ǫ AB of Alice and Bob is small. The second scenario happens when Alice and Bob share a state with high purity, i.e., Eve is very disentangled. In this case, independently of the error ǫ AB , Eq. (3.3) can be fulfilled more easily. Despite the fact that efficiency generally increases with increasing entanglement, this enhancement, as depicted in the figure, is a complex function of the parameters involved. Nevertheless, one can see that there exist an entanglement threshold (around LN(γ AB ) ≃ 0.2) below which the protocol efficiency diminishes drastically no matter how mixed are the states shared between Alice and Bob.
It is also illustrative to examine the dependence of α (which determines the interval length D α ) on the entanglement of the states shared by Alice and Bob. In Fig. 3.2 we plot the logarithmic negativity of a given state versus the parameter α. States with the same entanglement but different purity are associated to quite different values of α. Nevertheless states with high entanglement permit a large interval length (small α) and, thus, high efficiency. In both, Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3 .2, we have observed that states with different entanglement give the same efficiency. However it is important to pointed out that to extract the key's bits, Classical Advantage Distillation [11] stills needs to be performed. The efficiency of Maurer's protocol, strongly increases with decreasing ǫ AB , and, therefore, the states with higher entanglement will provide a higher key rate.
Efficiency is a key issue for any experimental implementation of Quantum Cryptography since available resources are not unlimited. Here, we have shown that the sharing of entangled Gaussian variables and the use of only Gaussian operations permits efficient Quantum Key Distribution against individual and finite coherent attacks.
We have used the fact that all mixed NPPT symmetric states can be used to extract secret bits under individual attacks whereas under finite coherent attacks an additional condition has to be fulfilled. We have introduced a figure of merit (the efficiency E) to quantify the number of classical correlated bits that can be used to distill a key from a sample of M entangled states. We have observed that this quantity grows with the entanglement shared between Alice and Bob. This relation it is not one-to-one due to the fact that states with less entanglement but with more purity (eavesdropper more disentangled) can be equally efficient. Nevertheless we have point out that, these states would be inefficient, when performing the Classical Advantage Distillation of the key.
Finally, we would like to remark that our study is not restricted to Quantum Key Distribution protocols, but can be extended to any other protocol that uses as a resource entangled continuous variables to establish a set of classically correlated bits between distant parties, see e.g. [18] .
In [18] an efficient solution of the Byzantine Agreement problem (detectable broadcast) in the continuous variable scenario with multipartite entangled Gaussian states and Gaussian operations (homodyne detection) is presented. In a cryptographic context, detectable broadcast refers to distributed protocols in which some of the participants might have malicious intentions and could try to sabotage the distributed protocol inducing the honest parties to take contradictory actions between them. Entanglement is used in the protocol to distribute classical private random variables with a specific correlation between the players, in such a way that any malicious manipulation of the data can be detected by all honest parties allowing them to abort the protocol. We discuss realistic implementations of the protocol, which consider the possibility of having inefficient homodyne detectors, not perfectly correlated outcomes, and noise in the preparation of the resource states. The proposed protocol is proven to be robust and efficiently applicable under such non-ideal conditions.
Following [19] , it is known that, in spite of their exceptional role within the space of all continuous variables states, in fact, Gaussian states are not the best candidates as resources to perform Quantum tasks. In general, any continuous, strongly, superadditive functional acting on any given covariance matrix is minimised by Gaussian states. This is the case for all entanglement measures fulfiling the above conditions e.g. the distillable entanglement or the entanglement of formation. In this sense Gaussian states are extremal. With this idea on mind, naturally one could try to perform QKD with non-Gaussian states. Following the presented protocol here one should expect an enhancement on the efficiency on the key distribution with nonGaussian states. Gaussian states possess an easy mathematical description at the covariance matrix level while for non-Gaussian states this description is not complete. Nevertheless, the Wigner distribution function formalism presented here, allows to perform the needed calculations to study QKD with non-Gaussian states, in a very similar way.
Also, for non-Gaussian states there are no computable entanglement measures while these are well established in the case of Gaussian states. Thus, one might think that a way to quantify entanglement in non-Gaussian states can be accomplished by relating the efficiency of distilling correlated bits with the entanglement of nonGaussian states [20] . From the experimental point of view, there already exist several groups which actually have succeeded in producing non-Gaussian states like photonsubstracted, states that up to now lack of a complete well caracterisation.
